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A Dynamic-Epistemic Logic for Mobile
Structured Agents
Anya Yermakova and Alexandru Baltag
Abstract Multi-agent systems have been studied in various contexts of both appli-
cation and theory. We take Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), one of the formalisms
designed to reason about such systems, as the foundation of the language we will
build.
BioAmbient calculus is an extension of pi-calculus, developed largely for appli-
cations to biomolecular systems. It deals with ambients and their ability to commu-
nicate and to execute concurrent processes while moving.
In this paper we combine the formalism of Dynamic Epistemic Logic together
with the formalism of BioAmbient Calculus in order to reason about knowledge
maintained and gained upon process transitions. The motivation lies in developing a
language that captures locally available information through assignment of knowl-
edge, with potential application to biological systems as well as social, virtual, and
others.
We replace the ambients of BioAmbient Calculus with agents, to which we at-
tribute knowledge, and explore the parallels of this treatment. The resulting logic
describes the information flow governing mobile structured agents, organized hi-
erarchically, whose architecture (and local information) may change due to actions
such as communication, merging (of two agents), entering (of an agent into the inner
structure of another agent) and exiting (of an agent from the structure of another).
We show how the main axioms of DEL must be altered to accommodate the infor-
mational effects of the agents’ dynamic architecture.
Key words: dynamic epistemic logic, mobile agents, structured agents, multi-agent
system, subagent, indistinguishability of states, knowledge (logic), bioambient.
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2 Anya Yermakova and Alexandru Baltag
1 Introduction
We develop a formalism PADEL suited for talking about various multi-agent
systems. In particular, we discuss previous and potential applications to systems
of molecular biology, though the language is not limited to this. We develop the
notion of an agent, which can refer to an entire system or a subsystem thereof,
all seen as informational (and information-acquiring) systems. Information locally
available to a given system is treated as knowledge and the flow and exchange of
information between systems as dynamics of knowledge in a multi-agent setting. For
all of the above, we rely on a formalism derived from Dynamic Epistemic Logic and
BioAmbient Calculus.
We assume the following things about the architecture of these agents: First, the
number of agents (and thus subagents) is always finite. Second, they are nested in a
dynamic tree structure (with no loops).
In addition to typical communication actions, such as sending and receiving in-
formation or public announcements, we consider three specific actions which in-
volve mobility: entering, exiting, and merging. The formalisation and the specific
rules for the latter are inspired largely by Luca Cardelli’s developments in BioAm-
bient Calculus1, which aims to formalize information flow in systems of molecular
biology.
2 The formalism and motivation ofPADEL
At a given state, an agent is to be defined by an assignment of concurrent processes,
and in a given process there can occur agents, capabilities, or other non-agent, non-
capability processes.
2.1 Basic Definitions
Let A be a finite set of agents and A c a finite set of atomic actions.
An agent A ∈A occurs in a process P, or Av P, iff

Av A
Av P⇒ Av P | Q
Av P⇒ Av Q | P
Av P⇒ Av a.P
where P | Q denotes two processes running in parallel and a.P denotes an action
capability a, which, if executed, will initiate a process P.
We define v+ as the transitive closure of v:
1 See [10] and [11]
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A v+ P ⇔ ∃ a chain P0,P1, ...,Pn of processes s.t. n > 0, A = P0, P = Pn, and
Pi−1 v Pi, for all i≤ n.
An agent A ∈A is a subagent of P, or A < P, iff

A < A | P
A < P | A
A < P⇒ A < P | Q
A < P⇒ A < Q | P
Definition A state s is an assignment of Processes to Agents, s : Agents→Processes,
such that for every two distinct agents A,B ∈A and for any agent C ∈A :
C v s(A),C v s(B)⇒ A = B and A 6v+ s(A) (1)
That is, agent C cannot simultaneously occur in a process assigned to two differ-
ent agents and an agent cannot occur in a process assigned to itself.
For a given state s and two agents A,B, we define A <s B
de f
= A < s(B). We read
A <s B as “A is a subagent of (agent) B in state s.”
Consequences
A <s B⇒ Av s(B). (2)
From (1) and (2), it follows also that:
C <s A,C <s B⇒ A = B (3)
In other words, assignments s(A) and s(B) for different agents A 6= B must con-
tain no agents in common.
Definition We define <+s as the transitive closure of <s, and call it the iterative
subagent relation at state s, while referring to <s as the one−step subagent relation.
A <+s B ⇔ ∃ a finite chain A0,A1, ...,An
s.t. n > 0, A = A0, B = An, and Ai−1 <s Ai, for all i≤ n.
Consequence 3 in turn disallows loops in the tree of agents:
Proposition [Tree Property] For A 6= B:
C <+s A, C <
+
s B ⇒ A <+s B∨B <+s A. (4)
Proof. We prove this by induction on the length of the chain. By the hypothesis,
there must exist two chains, where A 6= B:
C = X1 <s X2 <s ...Xi−1 <s Xi <s Xi+1 <s ... <s Xn = A and
C = Y1 <s Y2 <s ...Yi−1 <s Yi <s Yi+1 <s ... <s Ym = B.
Without loss of generality, suppose n≤ m (the case for m < n is similar).
Then, by (3), X2 =Y2, and again by (3), X3 =Y3, and so on until Xn =Yn, ⇒ A=Yn.
Now, if n = m, then A = Ym = B, contradicting the fact that A and B were assumed
to be distinct.
If n < m, then A=Yn <s Yn+1 <s ... <s Ym = B and we have shown that A <+s B. uunionsq
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Given a finite set A of agents, denoted by A,B,C,A1, ...,An, and given a finite
setA c of atomic actions, denoted by a,ai,a, we combine the syntax of BioAmbient
Process Algebra and DEL, adding only the atomic sentence A <+ B, and define the
sentences of propositional logic together with the one−step subagent relation. ϕ,ψ
are formulae and p are propositional sentences in the language:
Table 1 Syntax and Definitions
Assume A,B,C are distinct agents. Then:
P ::= 0 | A | (P | P) | Σiai.Pi
ϕ ::= A <+ B | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | KAϕ | DKA1,...,Anϕ | [α]ϕ
α ∈ {(aA,aB)}
a,ai,a ∈ {ϕ?, ϕ!, enter, accept, exit, expel, merge+, merge−}
ϕ ∨ψ :de f= ¬(¬ϕ ∧¬ψ)
ϕ ⇒ ψ :de f= ¬(ϕ ∨ψ)
ϕ ⇔ ψ :de f= (ϕ ⇒ ψ)∧ (ψ ⇒ ϕ)
A <C :
de f
= A <+ C ∧ ∧B∈A ¬(A <+ B ∧ B <+ C)
< α > ϕ :de f= ¬[α]¬ϕ
> :de f= p∨¬p, for some fixed p
⊥ :de f= p∧¬p, for some fixed p
2.2 Actions
The set A c of atomic actions is finite. Similar to the notions of executability, or
precondition, in DEL, agent A must have the capability a.P included in the pro-
cesses assigned to it at the initial state in order for aA to take place (agent A executing
action a).
The capabilities each agent is assigned at a given state are expressed as a nonde-
terministic sum of atomic actions ∑
i
ai.Pi, each of which is attached to the process
that would initiate as a result of A performing a given atomic action.
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2.2.1 State Transitions
Following the Bioambient improvement on Ambient Calculus, we only allow suit-
able action pairs to induce state transitions. A cell has to accept a virus that is trying
to enter, just like an announcement must be heard in order for it to affect an agent’s
knowledge.
We define actions α as dual pairs of atomic actions, which form a finite set iA c:
α = (a,a) ∈A c x A c = iA c.
We use B :s α to denote agent B’s participation in action α at state s. For α =
(aA,aC):
B :s α
de f
= A≤+s B ∨ C ≤+s B and ∃s′ s.t. s α→ s′
We define four types of actions, of which three involve a one− step superagent
E whose state assignment is crucial to the executability of the action (see Figure 1).
For any agents A,C,E that are distinct:
αI = (ϕ?A,ϕ!C),
αII = (enterA,acceptC,E),
αIII = (exitA,expelC,E),
αIV = (merge+A,merge−C,E)
Fig. 1 Motivated by work
of Luca Cardelli (see [9]-
[11]), this figure depicts the
application of this language
to molecular biology. B, C,
and D show the change in
structure of processes and
subprocesses as a result of
acting on dual capabilities
(Types II, III, IV, respec-
tively), separated by no more
than two ”membranes.” In
PADEL , we can think of
each ”membrane” with all its
contents as a unique agent.
n [P |Q|m[R]]
C
A
B
D
P
Q R
m
n
m[enter c. P |Q] | n[accept c. R|S]→ n[R|S |m[P |Q]]
Q
m
enter c.P
S
accept c.R
n
Q
m
P
R
S
n
m[merge+ c. P |Q] | n[merge- c. R|S]→ m[P |Q|R|S]
Q
m
merge+ c.P
S
merge- c.P
n
Q
P
R
S m
n[m[exit c. P |Q] | expel c. R|S]→ m[P |Q] | n[R|S]
Q
m
exit n.P
expel n.R
S
n
P
Q
m
R
S
n
We now define the state transitions for the four different types of actions.
Type I For αI = (aA,aC), where (a,a) = (ϕ?,ϕ!):
s
αI→ s′ iff
∃ a,ai,P,Pi,Q such that s(A) = ∑i ai.Pi+a.P | Q,
∃ a,c j,R,R j,S such that s(C) = ∑ j c j.R j +a.R | S,
s′(A) = P | Q, s′(C) = R | S, s′(X) = s(X), for all X 6= A,C.
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This is the only type of action that does not change the structure of the tree of
agents.
Type II For αII = (aA,aC,E) where a = enter, a = accept:
s
αII→s′ iff
∃ a,ai,P,Pi,Q such that s(A) = ∑i ai.Pi+a.P | Q,
∃ a,c j,R,R j,S such that s(C) = ∑ j ci.R j +a.R | S,
∃ Γ , a process, such that s(E) = A |C | Γ , and
s′(A) = P | Q, s′(C) = A | R | S, s′(E) =C | Γ , s′(X) = s(X), for all X 6= A,C,E.
After αII state transition, agent C is assigned a new agent, while agent E –
the initial superagent of both C and A – is stripped of the one− step subagent A:
E
A C
αII=⇒ E
C
A
Type III For αIII = (aA,aC,E) where a = exit, a = expel:
s
αIII→s′ iff
∃ a,ai,P,Pi,Q such that s(A) = ∑i ai.Pi+a.P | Q,
∃ a,c j,R,R j,S such that s(C) = ∑ j ci.R j +a.R | A | S,
∃ Γ , a process, such that s(E) =C | Γ , and
s′(A) = P | Q, s′(C) = R | S, s′(E) =C | A | Γ , s′(X) = s(X), for all X 6= A,C,E.
After αIII this state transition, the effect is exactly opposite to that of transitions
by actions of Type II:
E
C
A
αIII=⇒ E
A C
Type IV αIV , defined as (aA,aC,E) where a = merge+, a = merge−:
s
αIV→s′ iff
∃ a,ai,P,Pi,Q such that s(A) = ∑i ai.Pi+a.P | Q,
∃ a,c j,R,R j,S such that s(C) = ∑ j ci.R j +a.R | S,
∃ Γ , a process, such that s(E) = A |C | Γ , and
s′(A) = P | Q | R | S, s′(C) = 0, s′(E) = A | Γ , s′(X) = s(X), for all X 6= A,C,E.
E
A C
αIV=⇒ E
A
The following validities follow immediately from the definitions, where, as in
DEL,
< αi > > denotes executability of αi, and [αi]ϕ denotes a statement ϕ that holds
true after action αi:
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Table 2 Consequences of Action Definitions
Assume A,C,E are distinct agents. Then:
< αII >> ⇒ A < E ∧C < E
< αIII >> ⇒ A <C∧C < E
< αIV >> ⇒ A < E ∧C < E
[αII ]A <C
[αIII ]A < E
[αIV ]¬C < E
2.3 Indistinguishability Relations on States and Actions
As in Epistemic Logic (EL), we define indistinguishability of two states for a par-
ticular agent A, denoted by ∼A, in order to reason about knowledge.
Definition [Indistinguishability of states] s∼A s′ iff s(X) = s′(X), for all X ≤+s A.
That is, two states are equivalent for agent A if and only if they are indistin-
guishabe for A and all of its subagents, as assigned at state s. Two states can be
indistinguishable for a group of agents B1, ...,Bn if none of them can distinguish
between these states:
Definition [Indistinguishability of states for a group of agents] s ∼B1,...,Bn s′ iff
s(X) = s′(X), for all X ≤+s Bi, for all 1≤ i≤ n.
We define indistinguishability of actions:
Definition [Equivalence of actions] Here s represents any state in the history.
α A∼s α ′⇔
{
either A :s α and α = α ′
or ¬A :s α and ¬A :s α ′
If A is a participant in α , then it would certainly be able to differentiate between
taking part in two different actions α and α ′, unless they were actually the same. On
the other hand, if A does not participate in either α ot α ′, then both actions appear
equivalent to A. This implies that A is a subagent of both agents executing α .
3 Semantics
We will evaluate logical formulas on histories, which are sequences of states and
actions (representing possible histories of a system). However, in order to define
the semantics for epistemic and dynamic modalities, we need to define appropri-
ate (epistemic) indistinguishability relations and (dynamic) transition relations on
histories, by lifting to histories the corresponding state relations.
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3.1 Relations on Histories
To ensure that our knowledge is accumulative, as in DEL, we must expand the lan-
guage to include Perfect Recall and extend equivalence relations to state transitions
and to previous states. For this we define histories and develop axioms based on
histories rather than states.
We define a history h as a sequence of alternating states and actions:
h = (s0,α0,s1,α1, ...,sn−1,αn−1,sn) s.t.
si
αi→ si+1 for all i < n.
• (h,α, t) := (s0,α0,s1,α1, ...,sn−1,αn−1,sn,α, t) iff sn α→ t
• |h| denotes the size of the history, equal to the number of state-action pairs in the
history, not counting the final state
• last(h) = sn. We use the convention of h |= ϕ iff last(h) |= ϕ , read “history h
satisfies statement ϕ if and only if the last state in history h satisfies statement ϕ”
We extend the notion of state indistinguishability to history indistinguishability
for an agent A.
Definition [Equivalence of histories]
Let h = (s0,α0,s1,α1, ...,si,αi, ...,αn−1,sn) and
let h′ = (s′0,α
′
0,s
′
1,α
′
1, ...,s
′
i,α ′i , ...,α ′n−1,s
′
n), then
h A∼ h′⇔∀i ∈ {0,1,2, ....n} : |h|= |h′| and si A∼ s′i and αi A∼si α ′i
Definition [History transition]
For two histories h,h′,
h α→ h′ iff ∃t s.t. h′ = (h,α, t).
Proposition [Perfect Recall] This follows from the definitions above and ensures
uniqueness of history transitions.
h′ ∼C h′′, h′ = (h1,α,s′), h′′ = (h2,β ,s′′) ⇒ |h1|= |h2|, h1 ∼C h2, α ∼C β .
Proposition Indistinguishable histories for an agent remain indistinguishable for
its subagents in the last state:
h∼C h′, A <+last(h) C ⇒ h∼A h′
Proof. si(X) = s′i(X), for all i, for all X ≤+ C implies the same for X ≤+ A since A
is a subagent of C.
Now, for each αi ∼C α ′i in the histories, if C is not a participant of α and they appear
to be the same, then by definition of participation the same holds for A since it is a
subagent.
If C :si α , then αi = α ′i . In this case, regardless of whether or not A participates in
α , the two appear the same to it. uunionsq
The definition for equivalence of histories for a group of agents is similar:
A Dynamic-Epistemic Logic for Mobile Structured Agents 9
h∼B1,...,Bn h′
de f
:= h∼B1 h′∩ ... ∩h∼Bn h′ (5)
3.2 Semantics
The semantics of our language is embodied by a satisfaction relation |= between
histories and logical formulas, which is defined by the inductive clauses in Table 3.
The definition is by induction on formulas. For A,B,B1, ...,Bn, distinct, ∈A :
Table 3 Semantics
h |= A <+ B iff A <+last(h) B
h |= ¬ϕ iff h 6|= ϕ
h |= ϕ ∧ψ iff h |= ϕ and h |= ψ
h |= KAϕ iff ∀(h′ ∼A h) : h′ |= ϕ
h |= DKB1,...,Bnϕ iff ∀(h′ ∼B1,...,Bn h) : h′ |= ϕ
h |= [α]ϕ iff ∀h α→ h′ : h′ |= ϕ
4 Proof System
We use axioms and rules of inference from propositional logic and those of DEL2,
together with those specific to our formalism. In addition, we outline reduction laws,
with select proofs. In this section, A,B,C,X ,Y,B1, ...,Bn,A1, ...,An are agents ∈A .
Table 4 Axioms of Knowledge
` DKAϕ ⇔ KAϕ G1
` KAϕ ⇒ DKA,B1,...,Bnϕ KtoDK
` A <+ C ⇒ KC(A <+ C) KOwn
` A <+ C ∧ C <+ B ⇒ DKB,A1,...,An (A <+ C) DKOwn
B1, ...,Bn <+ A ∧ DKB1,...,Bnϕ ⇒ KAϕ KfromDK
2 These include the Necessitation and the Modus Ponens rules of inference, as well as KT45 axioms
and all tautologies of propositional logic. See [13] for more description.
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Proof. [KOwn] The right hand side of the statement is equivalent to ∀h′(h∼C h′ ⇒
h′ |= A <+ C). By the definition of equivalence, we have that ∀i, si(X) = s′i(X), for
all X ≤+ C, which implies that state assignments, for all states in histories h,h′ will
be the same for C and its subagents.
But then last(h)(X) = last(h′)(X) will also hold true for X =C and X = A and all
agents in between them, thus satisfying h′ |= A <+ C. uunionsq
Axioms R, Trans, and Tree reveal the loop-less tree structure of agents.
Axiom R ` ¬A <+ A
Axiom Trans ` A <+ B∧B <+ C ⇒ A <+ C
Axiom Tree ` (X <+ A∧X <+ B) ⇒ (A <+ B∨B <+ A)
Proof. [Axiom Tree] For s = last(h), the statement is semantically equivalent to
X <+s A and X <
+
s B, for some state s. But then by (4), we guarantee that B <
+
s A or
A <+s B, which is semantically equivalent to the desired result. uunionsq
We now explore reduction laws involving the dynamic modality.
Partial Functionality Axiom [α]¬ϕ ⇔ (< α >>⇒¬[α]ϕ)
That is, the transition induced by α , if it exists, goes to a unique next state: if
h α→ h′ and h α→ h′′, then h′ = h′′. This ensures uniqueness of transition.
The Preservation of Facts axiom of DEL demands several versions for the differ-
ent types of actions (see Table 5).
Proof. [PF4a] We unwrap the definition for Type IV action, found in 2.2.1, where
s = last(h). It follows:
If X <C at last(h), then X v S (occurs in process S).
Since s′(X) = s(X), for all X 6= A,C,E, then X still occurs in S at s′.
Since s′(A) is assigned process S, where X occurs, then X must be a subagents of A
at s′. uunionsq
Similarly, the Action-Knolwedge reduction laws are expanded for specificity (see
Table 6).
Note that the final rule in Table 6 is for non-participants of any action α . All
proofs are achieved by a counterfactual argument of “chasing the diagram,” though
we omit them here.
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Table 5 Preservation of Facts Axiomsa
[αI ]ϕ ⇔ (< αI >>⇒ ϕ) PF1
For X 6= A:
[αII ]X < Y ⇔ (< αII >>⇒ X < Y ) PF2a
For Y 6= E,C:
[αII ]A < Y ⇔ (< αII >>⇒ A < Y ) PF2b
For X 6= A:
[αIII ]X < Y ⇔ (< αIII >>⇒ X < Y ) PF3a
For Y 6= E,C:
[αIII ]A < Y ⇔ (< αIII >>⇒ A < Y ) PF3b
(X <C) ⇒ [αIV ](X < A) PF4a
For X 6=C:
¬(X < A) ⇒ ([αIV ]X < Y ⇔ (< αIV >>⇒ X < Y )) PF4b
a Note that the Consequences outlined in Table 2 also belong to this category of reduction laws.
Table 6 Action-Knowledge Axioms
For X = A,C: [αI ]KXϕ ⇔ (< αI >>⇒ KX [αI ]ϕ) AcKn1a
(A <+ X ∨C <+ X)⇒ [αI ]KXϕ ⇔ (< αI >>⇒ KX [αI ]ϕ) AcKn1b
[αII ]KCϕ ⇔ (< αII >>⇒ DKA,C[αII ]ϕ) AcKn2a
C <+ X ⇒ [αII ]KXϕ ⇔ (< αII >>⇒ KX [αII ]ϕ) AcKn2b
[αII ]KAϕ ⇔ (< αII >>⇒ KA[αII ]ϕ) AcKn2c
For X = A,C: [αIII ]KXϕ ⇔ (< αIII >>⇒ KX [αIII ]ϕ) AcKn3a
A <+ X ⇒ [αIII ]KXϕ ⇔ (< αIII >>⇒ KX [αIII ]ϕ) AcKn3b
[αIV ]KAϕ ⇔ (< αIV >>⇒ DKA,C[αIV ]ϕ) AcKn4a
A <+ X ⇒ [αIV ]KXϕ ⇔ (< αIV >>⇒ KX [αIV ]ϕ) AcKn4b
(X <+ A∧X <+ C)⇒ [α]KXϕ ⇔ ∧β∈iA c+,β∼Xα (< α >> ⇒ [β ]ϕ) AcKnNP
Theorem The proof system forPADEL is sound.
Proof. In order to show soundness, all axioms in the system must be valid. For all
axioms presented in gray boxes, validity was either proved in the text or it follows
from the semantic definitions. uunionsq
Theorem [Model-checking] The model-checking problem for PADEL is de-
cidable on finite models.
Proof. Given a model M with a countable set of histories h and formula ϕ , the
axioms and rules of inference are sufficient to decide whether or not ϕ is satisfiable
at M,h, since we have provided axioms for all syntactic combinations of terms ϕ
can have. uunionsq
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Corrollaries The following are semantically valid consequences of axioms and
rules of inference:
• ` A < B ⇒ A <+ B
• ` X < A ⇒ ¬X < B
• ` A <+ C ∧ C <+ B1, ...,Bn ⇒ DKB1,...,Bn(A <+ C)
• ` A <+ C ∧ C <+ B ⇒ KB(A <+ C)
• ` B1, ...,Bn <+ A ∧ DKB1,...,Bn,Aϕ ⇒ KAϕ
• (X <+ A) ⇒ [αIII ]¬(X <+ C)
5 Conclusion
We have thus developed a sound, decidable languagePADEL based on a nested
tree structure of a finite number of agents, which are defined by concurrent pro-
cesses, subagents and capabilities. Furthermore, we developed the notion of knowl-
edge and distributed knowledge for agents based on
1. the currect state of an agent, which captures its current one− step subagents and
its current capabilities for future interactions
2. the current state of all of its iterative subagents. This encodes a principle of
monotonicity of information: all information carried by a subagent is available
to any of its superagents
3. the memory of an agent, encoded in a history that each agent perceives differ-
ently. Following the premises of DEL, information is never lost and contradictory
knowledge is never acquired.
The presented axiomatization allows one to reason about knowledge and change in
knowledge of agents executing actions, as well as their subagents and superagents.
Further applications to biological systems remain to be explored, in particular seek-
ing to define “knowledge,” as described by indistinguishabilities, for a given biolog-
ical unit. It also remains to investigate whether the system is complete.
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